African Fintech Security

AI coding tools often generate invalid or insecure boilerplate for African payment providers. Veilguard natively prevents these oversights.

The Context

In 2024, unauthorized transfers resulting from an unverified webhook vulnerability led to the loss of ₦11B from a major Nigerian payment processor integrations.

Futhermore, Kenya's Data Protection Act strictly penalizes non-compliant handlers with fines up to KSh 5M, and Nigeria's NDPR demands explicit cryptographic trust for data moving between applications.

Protected Providers

Paystack

Secret scanning identifies sk_live_ and sk_test_. Webhook verification mandates checking the x-paystack-signature.

CRITICAL: crypto.createHmac('sha512', secret).update(body).digest('hex') != req.headers['x-paystack-signature']

Flutterwave

Detects exposed FLWSECK_LIVE constants and enforces that the verif-hash header is cross-referenced with your environment variables securely.

M-Pesa (Daraja API)

M-Pesa uses a callback mechanism rather than signed webhooks. Veilguard enforces IP address allow-listing and strictly monitors for the Daraja API production endpoints mapping.

WARNING: IP allowlist [196.201.214.*, 196.201.213.*] not verified on Daraja callback route.